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Vol. 30 No. 17 · 11 September 2008
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‘The
greatest single truth to declare itself in the wake of 1989,’ J.G.A. Pocock
wrote two years afterwards,
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is
that the frontiers of ‘Europe’ towards the east are everywhere open and
indeterminate. ‘Europe’, it can now be seen, is not a continent – as in the
ancient geographers’ dream – but a subcontinent: a peninsula of the Eurasian
landmass, like India in being inhabited by a highly distinctive chain of
interacting cultures, but unlike it in lacking a clearly marked geophysical
frontier. Instead of Afghanistan and the Himalayas, there are vast level areas
through which conventional ‘Europe’ shades into conventional ‘Asia’, and few
would recognise the Ural mountains if they ever reached them.
But, he went on, empires – of which in its fashion the European Union must be
accounted one – had always needed to determine the space in which they exercised
their power, fixing the borders of fear or attraction around them.
The
conflict in South Ossetia has produced a cloud of rhetoric that seems to have
grown in inverse proportion to the intensity of fighting on the ground. Once the
outcome became clear – a crushing Russian military victory – Cold War imagery
flooded the Western press. Far more than the status of a tiny mountainous
enclave in the South Caucasus was said to be at stake: not only was Georgia’s
territorial integrity imperilled by Russian tyranny, but the future of democracy
was under threat. In the Washington Post of 11 August, Robert Kagan
asserted that the co nflict will be seen as ‘a turning point no less
significant’ than the fall of the Berlin Wall. Given this ‘much bigger drama’,
‘the details of who did what to precipitate Russia’s war against Georgia are not
very important.’
In
1964, Harold Wilson described the record of the (outgoing) Conservative
government as ‘13 wasted years’. If the present Parliament lasts its full term –
as seems likely – the electorate will be asked to pass judgment on 13 years of
Labour rule. Voters today seem to have the same view of Labour as Wilson had of
the Tories all those years ago. Many who once wished Labour well are now
wondering whether they can vote Labour at all, or whether they should stop
voting tactically. This is an important decision: the Labour majorities in the
last three elections have been much enlarged by people choosing to vote for the
candidate thought most likely to defeat the Tory – a spontaneous alternative
vote. Since the country’s politicians have refused to reform the country’s
medieval system of voting, the electorate has reformed it for itself. But it is
a reform without any statutory basis: people can choose to practise it or not.
Labour thus faces a double threat. Not merely that people will no longer vote
Labour, but that they will vote as they really want to – Lib Dem, for example –
whatever the consequences. And they will do so because they no longer believe
keeping the Tories out is the main object of politics. Labour’s position, though
not irrecoverable, is therefore serious, approaching desperate.
- Your
Name Here by Helen DeWitt and Ilya Gridneff
Some
years ago, the novelist David Foster Wallace submitted himself to a long
television interview with Charlie Rose, the PBS chat-show host. It was a
terrific performance, and in it Wallace talked about why, in much of his work,
narrative is split into body-text and footnotes:
There’s a way, it seems to me, that reality’s fractured right now, at least
the reality that I live in. And the difficulty about . . . writing about that
reality is that text is very linear and it’s very unified, and . . . I, anyway,
am constantly on the lookout for ways to fracture the text that aren’t totally
disorienting – I mean, you can take the lines and jumble them up and that’s
nicely fractured, but nobody’s gonna read it.
Last year, Helen DeWitt posted this passage on paperpools, her blog: it ‘says
everything I might have wanted to say about life, the universe, postmodernism
and Your Name Here.’ Your Name Here is a 120,000-word novel; DeWitt is one of
its authors, the category of authorship itself having been split. (At this
point, it might have been appropriate to spin off into a footnote about its
other author, Ilya Gridneff, an Australian journalist of Russian origin, born in
Sydney in 1969 and currently working in Papua New Guinea for the Australian
Associated Press, except that the DeWitt/Gridneff partnership doesn’t do much
fracturing with footnotes. Epistolary structure and multiple avatars, yes, scans
of original documents, including contracts, because ‘without the contractual
details any book is just fogbound Jamesian kitsch,’ but not really footnotes:
perhaps because, since it’s an authorship made up of two people, the challenge
is to discover how, like Bloom and Stephen Dedalus, Don Gately and Hal
Incandenza, they might ever be brought together at all.)
Also
in this issue
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